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Good News from the North
Barry Rubin
March 29, 2005
Syria is in trouble, or is it? Just recounting the difficulties currently faced by the Damascus regime makes the situation sound desperate:
--An inexperienced dictator of questionable judgment.
--Long-term economic stagnation due to statist Soviet-style policies.
--Clear military inferiority to its neighbors with no reliable source of high-quality arms or superpower strategic backing.
--An adventurous policy of backing a terrorist war against two neighbors, Israel and Iraq.
--Further incurring American wrath by concealing wanted Iraqi officials, Weapons of Mass Destruction materials, and sponsoring terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.
--Pressure from both the Lebanese themselves and a U.S.-European alliance to end Syria's highly profitable domination of Lebanon, starting with a withdrawal of its troops promised 16 years ago.
--Facing a growing domestic Islamist challenge seeking to take the leadership of the some 70 percent of Syria's population who are Sunni Muslims. In demographic terms, the situation of Syria's ruling Alawite minority is far worse than that of the Sunni Muslims who used to rule in neighboring Iraq.
--Only Iran, itself internationally isolated, can be considered a reliable ally by Syria.
And the list goes on. If this weren't the Middle East, one might give the Syrian regime only six more months in power. Of course, even the Middle East is not quite what it used to be. While the trends should not be over-estimated, the old appeals to Arab nationalism, supporting one's local dictatorship, and blaming all problems on the United States and Israel are not as effective as they used to be. There is more talk of reform and democracy in the air. The USSR, Syria's reliable ally for so many decades, has been out of business for 15 years. While a visit from President Vladimir Putin shows that Moscow still takes an interest in Damascus, that connection is of limited usefulness. And Bashar al-Asad is only a pale shadow of his old man, the late dictator Hafiz al-Asad.
What we don't know is whether the older-generation elite of generals and Ba'th party bosses feel that Bashar has gotten them into a mess and they should get rid of him. The regime, though, still has plenty of assets. It controls the military and just about every other aspect of society. Other Arab states are showing solidarity in general, though both Iraq and Jordan are both angry at Syrian-backed subversion.
In the 1990s, Syria faced some--though fewer--of these same problems. But Hafiz al-Asad escaped from the trap by pretending to be moderate, supporting the international coalition against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, and negotiating with Israel. Bashar, however, has maneuvered himself into a corner by acting openly radical. He now opposes the international coalition over Iraq, supports the Lebanese Hizballah in its militant and terrorist activities. As for Israel, he hints that he wants to talk again but he is not trying very hard and no one believes he seriously intends to make peace.
Bashar's strategy mainly boils down to toughing it out, though the chances for this unsophisticated approach to succeed should not be underestimated. As long as no one attacks him directly, in the way the United States overthrew Saddam (which is extremely unlikely), his odds for survival are good. After all, in financial terms, a withdrawal from Lebanon does hurt many Syrians and he can use the age-old excuse of rallying Syrian patriotism by claiming the country is under assault by the United States and Israel. He can easily suppress liberal critics while finding new allies in the Islamists--with whom he cooperates on subverting Iraq--though this is a dangerous precedent for the future.
From Israel's standpoint and in terms of the prospectsfor Israel-Palestinian peace, a weaker Syria is a positive development. After all, Syria is the only Arab state that can actively aid Palestinian radicals and press the new leadership toward more radical policies. This shift also further reduces the conventional military threat to Israel and makes it harder for Syria to veto steps by other Arab states to develop relations with Israel.
The same basic point applies to Lebanon. While electoral politics may strengthen Hizballah, which has a lot of popularity among Shia Muslims, the largest group in the country, the new movement hardly wants a confrontation with Israel. Most Lebanese politicians understand that tension, much less violence, on the Lebanon-Israel border will undermine attempts at economic development or obtaining foreign investment.
They are not bold enough to make peace with Israel or suppress Hizballah's control in the south, but they do not want their country used for aggression by other Arab states or forces. This is why Walid Jumblatt, the Druze warlord considered the most important single leader of the opposition, has now stated that the Shaba Farms area--used by Hizballah as a pretext to attack Israel--actually belongs to Syria, as Israel claims. Any cross-border attacks are going to make Hizballah more unpopular, reinforcing the criticism that it supports continuing Syrian presence in Lebanon.
There is not much for Israel to do directly regarding these issues other than to avoid involvement. In future, though, the blame for terrorist attacks should be put squarely on Syria or Iran when appropriate, even if they are operating through Lebanese territory. Reprisals against Lebanese targets should be avoided except for those focused on any attacking Hizballah forces. Nor should Israel help Syria escape from its current problems by letting Damascus pretend to talk peace when it has no intention of reaching an agreement.
Even if there is not much to do, it is welcome that, for once, the news from the north is good.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), with Walter Laqueur (Viking-Penguin); the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan); A Chronological History of Terrorism, with Judy Colp Rubin, (Sharpe); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).
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