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The Battle for Lebanon
Barry Rubin
February 7, 2007
Round One of Hizballah's attempt to take over Lebanon has failed. Watch out for Round Two. The struggle over Lebanon is a battle in the war being waged by Iran, Syria and their allies seeking to control the Middle East.
Hizballah is the largest group representing the Shia Muslim community in multi-cultural Lebanon. But Hizballah is also the client of Tehran and Damascus, acting in their interest more than that of Lebanon itself. Indeed, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah the official local representative of Iran's spiritual guide.
Against Hizballah stand the majority of the other communities, Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Druze. This alliance controls the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora; the president, Emile Lahoud is a Syrian client, elected in 1998 when Damascus controlled the electoral process. Last summer's war, set off by Hizballah's cross-border raids against Israel, let the Islamist group pose both as victor and as Lebanon's patriotic champion.
Both claims are thin. Hizballah did not so much win as survive the war. Lebanon suffered tremendous material damage. While Hizballah staged showy ceremonies to give money for reconstruction--reportedly counterfeit U.S. dollars--it has done little since then. Moreover, the dispatch of a UN force to southern Lebanon as part of the ceasefire blocks Hizballah's ability to attack Israel or control that area.
Whatever political capital Hizballah gained in the war was quickly squandered as the group sought to take over Lebanon. Hizballah's arrogance and aggressiveness forced most other political forces to align against it.
In its propaganda, Hizballah denounced these rivals, known as the March 14 movement, as American and Israeli agents. This movement began after the assassination of popular former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri by Syria in February 2005. Since then, there have been about twenty terrorist operations, mostly attempts to murder other leading politicians or journalists, engineered by Syria.
In his shrill speeches, Nasrallah--who remained in hiding fearful of Israeli retaliation--took a hard-line stance. Demonstrations were organized, roads blocked, and massive sit-ins established to show Hizballah's power.
But the majority struck back. Christian and Sunni Muslim militias asserted their control over the places where those communities lived in Beirut. They also cut roads, showing that Shia neighborhoods could be easily surrounded and isolated. The government refused to resign.
Two things particularly anger most Lebanese. First, in its bid for power, Hizballah is ready to drag the country back to communal civil war. Everyone remembers the terrible strife and bloodshed that shook the country from 1975 to 1990 when 100,000 people were killed, 100,000 seriously injured, 250,000 emigrated, and almost 1 million displaced during that fighting in a country whose population is under 4 million. That Hizballah is ready to revive that senseless slaughter and wreckage in order to impose a Shia Islamist state on Lebanon--a country about half non-Muslim and 70 percent non-Shia--is horrifying.
The second problem is Hizballah's subservience to Iran and Syria. While the group does represent most, though by no means all, Lebanese Shia, its positions are often dictated by foreign interests.
For example, Hizballah is trying to block any serious inquiry into the Hariri murder and punishment of those responsible. Both UN-directed and Lebanese investigations have shown direct involvement by Syria's regime and its Lebanese clients. Indeed, the UN investigation named both the brother and brother-in-law of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as being behind the killing. Hizballah's and Syria's number-one demand is that the Lebanese government must abandon the effort to find who killed Hariri.
The number-two demand is that Hizballah be given 30 percent of the power in Lebanon's government. This alone would let it veto anything, like an attempt to disarm Hizballah's private army or put southern Lebanon under government rule. This would also be enough to give Hizballah, along with its pro-Syrian allies, control of the government altogether.
The other two demands, backed by Syria, are to have quick parliamentary elections, to get rid of the March 14 movement's legislative majority, but no presidential elections, to keep Syria's man in office. Lebanon's government is never going to accept these conditions. It is also unlikely--despite the temptation felt by many in the West--that democratic countries are going to turn over Lebanon to Syria in order to appease the Damascus regime.
As a result, Hizballah's first bid for power has been turned back. But it may not be long before Hizballah, and its Syrian sponsors, turn to Plan B. This would involve the assassination of Lebanese leaders. One cabinet minister, Gemayel, was killed last November, on a day when an attempt against another minister failed. If two more ministers were killed, the government would fall.
The other tactic could be attacks on UN forces in southern Lebanon in an attempt to drive them out of the country. Syria has hinted such assaults may take place. They would be blamed on shadowy al-Qaeda forces though carried out by Syrian agents.
Lebanon is a battlefield in the broader effort of Iran and Syria to gain hegemony in the region. It is imperative that Lebanon's government and majority be given international support so they can resist this campaign, whose ultimate power rests on a base of terrorism and subversion.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), with Walter Laqueur (Viking-Penguin); the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan); A Chronological History of Terrorism, with Judy Colp Rubin, (Sharpe); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).
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